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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BRET THOMAS CRIDDLE, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 950687-CA 
Priority No. 2 (incarcerated) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-a-3(2)(f) provides this Court's 
jurisdiction over this case from a court of record involving a 
second degree felony conviction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in denying trial counsel's motion 
for a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the State's 
case? 
In reviewing this issue, the Court must determine whether 
the State provided u'believable evidence of all of the elements 
of the crime charged.'" See State v. Emmett, 83 9 P.2d 781, 784 
(Utah 1992)(citation omitted). Mr. Criddle will marshal the 
evidence sustaining the charge in the State's case-in-chief, and 
demonstrate why the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law. 
See State v. Mincv, 838 P.2d 648, 652 n.l (Utah App. 
1992)(discussing the marshaling requirement), cert, denied, 843 
P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). 
This issue was properly preserved by Mr. Steele's motion for 
a directed verdict at the close of the State's case-in-chief (R. 
353-355). 
2. Does Mr. Criddle's incompetency at the time he stood 
trial require a new trial? 
Since this issue was not raised below, this Court must 
determine whether evidence of Mr. Criddle's incompetency arose 
during the proceedings, requiring the trial court to initiate 
competency proceedings. See State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1235-
38 (Utah 1989). See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2. This Court 
may resort to the ineffective assistance of counsel and/or plain 
error doctrines in addressing the merits of this issue. 
3. Does the trial court's failure to recuse herself 
require a new trial? 
Since this issue was not raised below, this Court must apply 
standards set forth in State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091 (Utah 
1988), cert, denied, 487 U.S. 1220 (1988), and determine whether 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 was complied with, whether 
there is a showing of actual prejudice, and whether there was an 
abuse of discretion. The Court may resort to the plain error 
doctrine in addressing the merits of this issue. 
4. Must the trial court hold a restitution hearing? 
In assessing the legality of the restitution order, the 
Court should apply the standards of review set forth in State v. 
Garcia, 866 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1993), as follow: 
Generally, "[u]nless a trial court exceeds the 
authority prescribed by law or abuses its discretion, 
we will not disturb its order of restitution." 
However, whether or not restitution is proper in this 
vcase depends solely upon interpretation of the 
governing statute, and the "trial court's 
interpretation of a statute presents a question of 
2 
law." "We accord a lower court's statutory 
interpretations no particular deference but assess them 
for correctness, as we do any other conclusion of law." 
State v. Garcia, 866 P.2d 5, 6 (Utah App. 1993)(citations 
omitted). 
This issue was preserved when Mr. Steele raised restitution 
issues before the trial court (R. 312-313), and when Mr. Fratto 
also raised restitution issues before the trial court (R. 225-
226) . 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes, rules and constitutional provisions 
are central to this appeal, and are copied in full in Addendum 
to this brief: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, section 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-1 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-3 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-4 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 23 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 2 9 
Utah Rule of Evidence 201. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE 
The State charged Mr. Criddle and Jonathan P. Remington by 
information signed on May 27, 1994, with one count of theft, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404; 
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and with one count of Criminal Mischief, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (R. 7-8). 
The court appointed Mr. Robert Steele of the Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association to represent Mr. Criddle (R. 23). After the 
preliminary hearing on February 15, 1995, Judge Burton ordered 
Mr. Criddle bound over as charged (R. 1). 
The State moved to dismiss the criminal mischief count prior 
to trial (R. 312). 
Judge Stirba presided over the case in district court, and 
at the district court arraignment on February 27, 1995, Mr. 
Criddle pled not guilty (R. 38). 
At the close of the State's case, Mr. Steele moved for a 
directed verdict because the State's evidence proved nothing more 
than Mr. Criddle's mere presence at the scene of the theft of the 
trailer (R. 353). Judge Stirba denied the motion for a directed 
verdict, finding that the jury could reasonably infer that when 
Mr. Criddle was present at the scene of the trailer theft, he was 
directing the truck driven by the co-defendant to hook up with 
the trailer (R. 354) . 
Judge Stirba rejected numerous defense instructions 
indicating that mere presence is not enough to justify a 
conviction (R. 365, 67, 84, 85, 86). The revised instruction she 
required read as follows: 
The mere presence of the defendant at the scene of 
the crime may not be sufficient evidence of his guilt. 
You may, however, infer his guilt from this fact and 
others presented at trial. In order to find the 
defendant guilty you must find, beyond a reasonable 
4 
doubt, that the defendant, having the appropriate 
mental state, acted in violation of the provisions of 
the law rather than merely being present or acquiescing 
in conduct or circumstances that might otherwise 
constitute a violation of the law. 
(R. 168). 
The jury convicted Mr. Criddle as charged, of theft (R. 
178) . 
Judge Stirba ordered a ninety day diagnostic evaluation 
prior to sentencing (R. 185). She also ordered that Dr. Linda 
Gummow evaluate Mr. Criddle, apparently at Mr. Steele's request 
(R. 191). 
On August 17, 1995, Mr. Steele withdrew from representing 
Mr. Criddle because a conflict of interest had arisen (R. 192, 
194). Judge Stirba appointed Joseph Fratto Jr. and Kevin 
Kurumada to represent Mr. Criddle (R. 114). 
At the sentencing on September 18, 1995, Judge Stirba 
ordered Mr. Criddle to serve a prison term of one to fifteen 
years, concurrently with the sentence imposed by Judge Brian (R. 
197). She also fined Mr. Criddle $2,500, plus an 85% surcharge. 
Judge Stirba ordered Mr. Criddle to pay restitution in the 
amount of $4,745, jointly and severally with Mr. Criddle's co-
defendant (R. 197). Prior to trial, Mr. Steele had argued that 
no restitution should be imposed because the restitution all 
flowed from the criminal mischief count, which was dismissed 
prior to trial on the State's motion (R. 312). Judge Stirba had 
indicated that she would address the matter later, but never did 
(R. 313). 
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Assuming that restitution could properly be awarded for 
damage done to the trailer and its contents, the trailer owner, 
Lester Gayheart, testified that the maximum damage done was 
$3,000 (R. 326). 
The total amount recommended in the presentence report was 
$4,652.87 (presentence report at 15), but the figures in the 
presentence report which supposedly itemize the restitution order 
total up to $3,930.87 (presentence report at 5). More 
importantly, the list of restitution items in the presentence 
report in Judge Stirba's case is identical to the list of figures 
in a separate case before Judge Brian involving a different 
victim, Steven Howe (presentence report at 5). 
Mr. Fratto argued at the sentencing hearing that there were 
questions as to the proper amount of restitution to be awarded 
(R. 225-27), but Judge Stirba ordered Mr. Criddle to pay 
$4,745.00 (R. 228). 
Judge Stirba indicated that Mr. Criddle could have a 
restitution hearing before the Board of Pardons if there was a 
conflict about what he owed (R. 228). 
During the course of proceedings, Mr. Criddle sent numerous 
letters to various court personnel in this case, which reflect 
his incompetency to stand trial, and are included in the addendum 
to this brief. Some of these letters were filed in a file 
separate from the pleadings file in the district court, and were 
transferred to this Court upon the motion of Mr. Anderson, under 
seal by Judge Stirba. 
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The day after sentencing Mr. Criddle, on September 19, 1995, 
Judge Stirba wrote to the chairman of the board of pardons, as 
follows: 
Dear Mr. Sibbett, 
This letter is written regarding Bret Criddle who 
I sentenced yesterday to one to 15 years for second 
degree felony theft. Last week, Judge Pat Brian 
sentenced Mr. Criddle to the Utah State Prison for 
similar offenses. 
I am aware that prior to his being sentenced by 
Judge Brian, Mr. Criddle made verbal and written 
threats to Judge Brian. In one of Mr. Criddle's several 
letters to me, Mr. Criddle made threatening comments 
towards me as well. 
Moreover, during sentencing, Mr. Criddle shouted 
at the Court, necessitating the transportation official 
to take Mr. Criddle's arm in an effort to calm him. 
Further, on his way back to the holding cell from the 
courtroom, Mr. Criddle spat on my door. In addition to 
his poor conduct, I am concerned about Mr. Criddle's 
"personalization" of the Court. For example, he 
addressed me as "Anne" in two letters to the Court; and 
in his letters generally, he seemed overly personal 
towards the Court. 
Based on the information about Mr. Criddle 
contained in the presentence report, the 90-day 
diagnostic evaluation, and his conduct before Judge 
Brian and me, in my opinion, Mr. Criddle is a very 
angry, unpredictable, unstable, explosive and 
potentially dangerous individual. 
I have never before requested that I be contacted 
prior to an inmate's release. However, I am doing so 
in this case because I believe Mr, Criddle is capable 
of coming back against the Court at some future time. 
Thus, I formally request that you notify me prior to 
any release of Bret Criddle, be it to a halfway house, 
on parole or at the expiration of his terms. 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
Sincerely yours, 
Ann M. Stirba 
District Court Judge 
(R. 199).x 
On October 10, 1995, Judge Stirba again wrote to Mr. 
A copy of the letter appears in the addendum to this brief. 
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Sibbett, stating, 
Enclosed for your information and consideration is 
a copy of a letter I received from Bret Criddle last 
week. As I stated in my previous letter to the Board, 
on September 19, 1995, I believe Mr. Criddle has 
somewhat focused on me as at least one of the causes of 
his problems. His persistent anger about my role as 
judge in this case and his tendency to refer to me by 
my name in his salutation continues to be of concern to 
me. 
Again, I request that I be notified prior to any 
release of him, be it to a halfway house, on parole or 
at the expiration of his term. 
Thank you for your consideration of this letter.2 
Patrick L. Anderson filed the notice of appeal on Mr. 
Criddle's behalf (R. 201). 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
At trial, the State established that Lester Gayheart owned a 
trailer and contents that were valued between $4,000 and $5,000, 
and were taken without his authorization from a condominium 
carport in Salt Lake County on or about April 21, 1994(R. 320-
326) . 
Matthew Schultz saw Mr. Criddle's co-defendant, Jonathan 
Remington, driving a truck near the carport prior to hitching the 
truck to the trailer, and also saw Mr. Criddle standing silently 
and motionless near the trailer and the truck (R. 328-339). 
The foregoing evidence was the essence of the State's case-
in-chief . 
In Mr. Criddle's defense case, Mr. Criddle testified that on 
2
 A copy of this letter appears in the addendum to this brief. 
It bears no numerical stamp from the district court because it 
was transferred to this Court in a sealed envelope from Judge 
Stirba. 
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April 22, 1995, Mr. Remington came over and asked if Mr. Criddle 
wanted to get drunk, and they shared a bottle of vodka (R. 3 69-
3 70). Mr. Remington told Mr. Criddle he needed to get some 
money, so they got in Mr. Remington's truck and drove to an 
apartment complex (R. 370). After Mr. Remington exited the truck 
and went into an apartment complex, he came back to the truck and 
drove over to some trailers (R. 371). Mr. Remington retrieved 
from a trailer a leather jacket that Mr. Criddle had seen him 
wear on two prior occasions (R. 371). Mr. Remington mentioned 
that he was glad to have the jacket back and that they were going 
to take the trailer (R. 371). Mr. Criddle did not participate in 
hitching the trailer to the truck in any way, inasmuch as he was 
wearing nice clothes (R. 371). Mr. Remington then had a 
conversation with Mr. Schultz, who happened by with a lawnmower 
(R. 3 72). As Mr. Remington began pulling out, the trailer hit 
the carport, and Mr. Remington drove off angrily and in a hurry 
(R. 3 72-373). Mr. Remington drove recklessly away and eventually 
detached the trailer by some storage sheds (R. 373). Mr. Criddle 
did not dare to get out while this was going on, for fear that 
Mr. Remington would think that Mr. Criddle had reported him in 
the event that Mr. Remington were arrested (R. 3 73). They later 
went out drinking at a bar, where Mr. Remington was bragging 
about having heisted a trailer (R. 374). This bothered Mr. 
Criddle, because he thought that the trailer was Mr. Remington's 
(R. 374). 
Mr. Remington stayed the night at Mr. Criddle's apartment at 
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Mr. Remington's invitation (R. 375). The next day, Mr. Remington 
saw a trailer in Mr. Criddle's apartment complex and suggested 
that they should take it (R. 375). They went and looked at the 
trailer, and it had four or five tags on it indicating that it 
should be removed from the parking lot, or would be towed (R. 
376). Mr. Criddle told Remington that it might have been 
abandoned, and that he would ask his apartment manager about it 
and see if they could have it (R. 3 77). Mr. Criddle and Mr. 
Remington, and another friend, Joseph Brollier, were later 
driving out of the apartment complex, to go to a bar, when Mr. 
Remington drove up to and hitched on the trailer with Mr. 
Brollier's assistance (R. 377-378). Mr. Criddle was shocked, and 
sat in the truck, not knowing what to do (R. 378). Mr. Remington 
drove off and went to a Midas Muffler shop, where they cut the 
lock off the trailer (R. 379). Mr. Brollier sold a sprayer out 
of the trailer to an employee at Midas for $5 (R. 3 90). When Mr. 
Remington drove off again, the trailer jack was still down (R. 
3 79) . He drove for a distance, causing damage to the trailer, 
and he and Mr. Criddle and Mr. Brollier were eventually 
apprehended by the police (R. 379-380). Mr. Criddle testified 
that he was convicted of theft of that trailer (R. 3 81). 
Detective Ben Jones testified that he interviewed Mr. 
Remington, Mr. Brollier, and Mr. Criddle after the recovery of 
the second trailer on April 23, 1995 (R. 391). Remington was 
aggressive and abusive and invoked his right to an attorney (R. 
3 92). Mr. Criddle was very cooperative, as was Mr. Brollier, who 
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told the police officer the same version of events as did Mr. 
Criddle (R. 393-394). 
The facts they conveyed to him were similar to those Mr. 
Criddle testified to at trial in this case (R. 395-397). 
However, Officer Jones did indicate that all three men hooked up 
the trailer, and that at the Midas shop, as far as he knew, Mr. 
Criddle participated with the other two men in telling the Midas 
employees that the trailer belonged to someone's ex-wife (R. 396-
3 98). His police report also indicated that it was Mr. Criddle 
who suggested that the sprayer be sold for five dollars, and 
participated in the plan to steal the trailer, indicating that he 
was going to ask the manager if they could have it (R. 397-399) . 
Jones testified that Mr. Criddle indicated that he knew the 
second trailer was stolen (R. 400). All three men were extremely 
intoxicated (R. 401). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse Mr. Griddle's conviction and order 
the case dismissed because the State failed to present a prima 
facie case in its case-in-chief. Mr. Criddle's mere presence at 
the scene of the theft did not establish his guilt of the theft 
as a matter of law. 
Mr. Criddle's letters and behavior in court demonstrate that 
he was not competent to stand trial. In the event that this 
Court does not order the case dismissed, the Court should order a 
new trial, which may occur only after Mr. Criddle's competency is 
fully evaluated and established. 
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In the event that the Court does not order the case 
dismissed, a new trial is also required before a different judge 
because Judge Stirba should have recused herself from this case 
because she felt personally threatened by Mr. Criddle. 
In the event that this Court does not order the case 
dismissed, this Court should remand the case for a restitution 
hearing. The restitution order imposed by the Court is 
inconsistent with the law, with the evidence presented in court, 
and with the presentence report (which is inconsistent with 
itself on the issue of restitution). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
IN THE STATE'S CASE IN CHIEF. 
A. FACTS 
At the close of the State's case-in-chief, Mr. Steele moved 
for a directed verdict because the State had proved nothing more 
than Mr. Criddle's mere presence at the scene of the trailer 
theft (R. 123). Judge Stirba denied the motion, stating, 
I think there is sufficient evidence for the case 
to go forward. I think it is a jury question. There 
is evidence, as Mr. Postma has argued, that the 
defendant was seen standing between the trailer and 
truck. And there can be a reasonable inference drawn, 
or an inference drawn which is not unreasonable, that 
the purpose of his standing there was to guide the 
truck to back up and pull the trailer away. 
Given the time frames and his proximity to this 
and the evidence about Mr. Remington as well, I 
respectfully deny the motion for a directed verdict. 
(R. 354-55). 
Judge Stirba refused to give the jury the instructions 
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submitted by Mr. Steele indicating that mere presence is not 
enough to justify a conviction (R. 365, 67, 84, 85, 86), but 
instructed the jury instead that 
The mere presence of the defendant at the scene of 
the crime may not be sufficient evidence of his guilt. 
You may, however, infer his guilt from this fact and 
others presented at trial. In order to find the 
defendant guilty you must find, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the defendant, having the appropriate 
mental state, acted in violation of the provisions of 
the law rather than merely being present or acquiescing 
in conduct or circumstances that might otherwise 
constitute a violation of the law. 
(R. 168).3 
Assuming that the marshaling requirement applies in this 
context, see State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 652 n.l (Utah App. 
1992)(discussing the marshaling requirement), cert. denied, 843 
P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992), marshaling the evidence leads to the 
conclusion that the evidence in the State's case-in-chief should 
have resulted in a directed verdict of acquittal. 
In the State's case-in-chief, the State called four 
witnesses: Lester Gayheart, Matthew R. Schultz, Arthur D. 
Lindquist, and Robert Hall. 
Lester Gayheart owned the trailer and contents, and 
testified that he did not authorize anyone to remove it from the 
carport (R. 320-326). He was not acquainted with Mr. Criddle, 
and did not witness the theft of the trailer (R. 324-325). 
Matthew R. Schultz did maintenance work at the condominiums 
Copies of the requested and revised instructions are in the 
addendum to this brief. 
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from which the trailer was stolen (R. 328-329). On April 21, 
1994, Mr. Schultz saw John Remington driving a pick-up truck and 
backing the truck toward the trailer (R. 330). He saw Mr. 
Criddle standing between the truck and trailer as the trailer was 
backing up (R. 330-331). His description of Mr. Criddle's 
activities was as follows: 
Q Let me back up a little bit. Tell me where 
the defendant was standing and what he was doing as you 
saw this truck backing up. 
A He was standing between the truck and the 
trailer. I was only there for a few minutes. He 
wasn't doing much. He was just standing there at the 
time. 
(R. 331). Mr. Schultz said that the truck and the trailer were 
three feet apart, and that Mr. Criddle was between them (R. 332). 
Mr. Schultz did not know if Mr. Criddle was directly behind the 
truck (R. 332). 
Mr. Schultz first said he could not recall if the truck was 
moving when Schultz happened by, but did recall that Mr. 
Remington had just gotten out of the truck and began talking to 
Schultz (R. 333, 338). He later testified that he did not see 
the truck moving (R. 337). Mr. Schultz testified that while he 
and Mr. Remington were talking with one another, Mr. Criddle 
stayed ten feet away from them (R. 338). 
Mr. Schultz did not see the truck move, or see anyone hook 
up the trailer (R. 339). When defense counsel stated, "He may 
have been lining up the truck but you didn't see him make any 
motion?" Mr. Schultz responded, "No. I just saw him standing 
there." (R. 339). 
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Mr. Schultz picked Mr. Remington and Mr. Criddle from a 
photo array (R. 335-336). 
He never testified that he saw Mr. Criddle and Mr. Remington 
communicate with one another in any way.4 
Arthur D. Lindquist did not witness the theft, but testified 
about damage to the carport (R. 34 0-343). He had not seen Mr. 
Criddle at the condominiums from which the trailer was stolen (R. 
344) . 
Robert Hall was the police officer who conducted the photo 
array with Mr. Schultz (R. 346-351). 
From the marshaling of the evidence, above, the Court can 
see that the State proved nothing more than Mr. Criddle's mere 
presence at the scene of the theft. He was seen standing between 
the truck and trailer when the truck was not moving, and was not 
seen doing anything with the trailer, the truck or the truck's 
driver. According to the State's evidence, Mr. Criddle was less 
involved in the theft of the trailer than was the State's 
witness, Matthew Schultz, who was not only present at the scene 
of the theft, but also spoke with the person driving the truck 
who eventually took the trailer. 
B. LAW 
It is well established that one's mere presence at the scene 
of a crime does not give rise to a permissible inference of 
criminal activity. Mere presence at the scene of a crime does 
4
 A copy of the transcript pages containing Mr. Schultz's 
testimony is in the addendum to this brief. 
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not give rise to probable cause,5 or even to a reasonable 
suspicion.6 Mere presence at the scene of a crime cannot be the 
basis of a criminal conviction, even on the theory of accomplice 
liability.7 
The jury instructions submitted by Mr. Steele were 
consistent with the foregoing law (R. 67, 84, 85, 86), while the 
revised instruction given by the court incorrectly implied that a 
conviction might rest solely on the basis of Mr. Criddle's 
presence at the scene of the crime.8 
5
 See e.g. State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1383 (Utah 1986)(no 
probable cause to search person in the presence of others for 
whom there is probable cause to search, or on premises where 
there is probable cause to search). 
6
 See e.g. State v. Svkes, 840 P.2d 825, 828 (Utah App. 
1992)(summarizing cases demonstrating that one's mere proximity 
to criminal activity does not give rise to a reasonable inference 
that one is a participant in the criminal activity); State v. 
Munsen, 821 P.2d 13, 15-16 (Utah App. 1991)(same), cert. 
denied,843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
7
 See e.g. State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah App. 
1991)(presence of person in car with illegal drugs does not 
support conviction for possession of drugs); State v. Kerekes, 
622 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1980)("An accomplice, as defined by s 
76-2-202, is one who is also criminally liable for the conduct 
charged. Mere presence, or even prior knowledge, does not make 
one an accomplice when he neither advises, instigates, 
encourages, or assists in perpetration of the crime.")(citations, 
footnote omitted); State v. Fertig, 233 P.2d 347, 349 (Utah 
1951)("Mere presence combined with knowledge that a crime is 
about to be committed or a mental approbation while the will 
contributes nothing to the doing of the act, will not of itself 
constitute one an accomplice."). 
8
 The revised instruction read, 
The mere presence of the defendant at the scene of 
the crime may not be sufficient evidence of his guilt. 
You may, however, infer his guilt from this fact and 
others presented at trial. In order to find the 
defendant guilty you must find, beyond a reasonable 
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Because the State's evidence in its case-in-chief 
established nothing more than that Mr. Criddle was seen standing 
near the scene of the trailer theft, and failed to establish 
participation or even communication with Mr. Remington, who was 
driving the truck that was apparently approaching the trailer, 
the trial court should have granted the motion for a directed 
verdict of acquittal. See e.g. Fertig, supra. 
II. A NEW TRIAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE MR. CRIDDLE WAS TRIED 
WHILE HE WAS INCOMPETENT. 
A. THE LAW 
Due process of law forbids the trial of an incompetent 
defendant, and requires trial courts to hold competency 
proceedings if evidence of incompetence arises during the course 
of proceedings. E.g. State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1235-38 
(Utah 1989). See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-1("No person who is 
incompetent to proceed shall be tried or punished for a public 
offense."). 
Incompetency is defined by Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2, which 
provides, 
For the purposes of this chapter, a person is 
incompetent to proceed if he is suffering from a mental 
disorder or mental retardation resulting either in: 
(1) his inability to have a rational and factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him or of the 
doubt, that the defendant, having the appropriate 
mental state, acted in violation of the provisions of 
the law rather than merely being present or acquiescing 
in conduct or circumstances that might otherwise 
constitute a violation of the law. 
(R. 168)(Emphasis added). 
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punishment specified for the offense charged; or 
(2) his inability to consult with his counsel and 
to participate in the proceedings against him with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5 further illuminates factors to be 
considered in the competency equation. It sets forth criteria 
for competency examiners to consider and address in reporting to 
the courts in competency proceedings, stating, 
(4) The experts shall in the conduct of their 
examination and in their report to the court consider 
and address, in addition to any other factors 
determined to be relevant by the experts: 
(a) the defendant's present capacity to: 
(i) comprehend and appreciate the 
charges or allegations against him; 
(ii) disclose to counsel pertinent 
facts, events, and states of mind; 
(iii) comprehend and appreciate the 
range and nature of possible penalties, if 
applicable, that may be imposed in the 
proceedings against him; 
(iv) engage in reasoned choice of legal 
strategies and options; 
(v) understand the adversary nature of 
the proceedings against him; 
(vi) manifest appropriate courtroom 
behavior; and 
(vii) testify relevantly, if applicable; 
(b) the impact of the mental disorder, or 
mental retardation, if any, on the nature and 
quality of the defendant's relationship with 
counsel; 
(c) if psychoactive medication is currently 
being administered: 
(i) whether the medication is necessary 
to maintain the defendant's competency; and 
(ii) the effect of the medication, if 
any, on the defendant's demeanor and affect 
and ability to participate in the 
proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-3 allows for the filing of competency 
18 
petitions by the defendant, by anyone representing the defendant, 
by anyone having custody of or supervision over the defendant, or 
by the prosecutors. Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-4 allows a trial 
court to raise the issue of competency at any time. 
B. THE FACTS 
Mr. Criddle's conduct in court, his progression of letters 
to the judge and other judicial and political figures, and the 
psychological evaluation in Mr. Criddle's 90 day diagnostic 
report demonstrate that Mr. Criddle should not have been tried 
because he was incompetent. As discussed below, his paranoid 
schizotypal mental disorder left him unable to rationally 
understand the most fundamental rudiments of the criminal 
process, to make rational choices, or to conduct himself 
appropriately in the courtroom. 
1. Mr. Criddle's Behavior In Court Demonstrates His 
Incompetency. 
As Judge Stirba's first letter to the board of pardons 
demonstrates, Mr. Criddle's behavior in court was inappropriate. 
The threat to Judge Brian referred to in Judge Stirba's letter 
involved Mr. Criddle pantomiming shooting himself in the head and 
then pointing to Judge Brian in open court in a case that was 
being prosecuted at approximately the same time as the instant 
case (R. 32, 34 in this Court's case number 950639-CA, in the 
addendum).9 
Mr. Criddle provides these pages of the record from 
Judge Brian's court in his addendum in seeking judicial notice of 
the record by this Court. 
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Mr. Criddle also behaved strangely in Judge Stirba's court. 
For instance, prior to Mr. Criddle's testimony, Judge Stirba 
warned Mr. Criddle that his testimony would likely lead to the 
introduction of damaging evidence related to his other conviction 
for a theft of a trailer which occurred the day after the events 
at issue in the instant case. Mr. Criddle stated, "Yeah, yeah. 
It will only help me." (R. 368). 
At the sentencing hearing before Judge Stirba, as Judge 
Stirba's letter to the board of pardons reflects, Mr. Criddle 
repeatedly interrupted Judge Stirba (R. 227), and apparently spat 
on her door on his way out of the courtroom (R. 199, in 
addendum). When Judge Stirba asked Mr. Criddle if he would like 
the opportunity to make a statement in court, Mr. Criddle stated, 
Yes, I would. As I have stated in most of my 
letters and as I stated in trial, I didn't commit a 
crime. That's just a fact. Someone came to my 
apartment and picked me up and took me out for a ride. 
I didn't think they were committing a crime at the 
time. And I would have assisted them but I wasn't 
capable of it. The person would not allow me the 
capability to do anything. I sat there with idle hands 
while he performed the entire action. 
I was convicted by a jury of people that I 
recognize from the first neighborhood that I lived in 
Particularly because Judge Stirba was aware of and 
influenced by Mr. Criddle's conduct in Judge Brian's court, it 
appears appropriate for this Court to take judicial notice of the 
record of proceedings in that court. Compare Utah Rule of 
Evidence 201 (requiring Courts to take judicial notice of facts 
"not subject to reasonable dispute" "if requested by a party and 
supplied with the necessary information" at "any stage of the 
proceeding."), with Mel Trimble v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 
P.2d 451, 455-56 (Utah App.)(mandatory judicial notice is 
applicable only to trial courts, that appellate courts have 
discretion to decline to take judicial notice), cert. denied, 769 
P.2d 819 (Utah 1988). 
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in Salt Lake City. And I believe those people were 
prejudiced against me by a person who I was a roommate 
with there who we have had bad relations since then. I 
don't think that any Court would be right that would 
commit me to do any time whatsoever in this situation. 
I didn't commit a crime. And I cannot believe that you 
or this court would be in the right to commit me to do 
any more time, even one more day. Thank you. 
(R. 224). 
Mr. Griddle's inappropriate behavior in court reflects Mr. 
Criddle's failure to have a rationale understanding of the 
proceedings against him, and his inability to participate in the 
proceedings in a rational or reasonable understanding. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-15-2, supra, (defining incompetency). 
2. Mr. Criddle's Written Correspondence Demonstrate his 
Incompetency. 
All of Mr. Criddle's available correspondence is included in 
the addendum to this brief. 
In addition to the letters he wrote to Judge Stirba, during 
the course of proceedings, Mr. Criddle also attempted to enlist 
the assistance of Judge Fuchs (R. 21-22), Judge Peuler (R. 200), 
Judge Hanson (R. 213-215), and all government employees (R. 216) 
in obtaining relief from various perceived injustices. 
The letter he wrote to Judge Stirba prior to sentencing 
while he was at the diagnostic unit exemplifies how Mr. Criddle's 
correspondence with the court reflects his failure to appreciate 
the nature of the proceedings, and failure to participate in the 
proceedings with a rational degree of understanding. It states, 
DEAR ANNE, 
YOUR HONOR. THIS IS BRET CRIDDLE. HERE AT THE 
DIAGNOSTIC UNIT THEY BELIEVE I'M SANE. BUT I DON'T! I 
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CAN'T POSSIBLY BE SANE TO EVEN BE HERE! I DIDN'T 
COMMIT A CRIME! NO WAY NO HOW! THE POLICE FAILED TO 
COME UP WITH THE TRANSCRIPTS BEFORE THE TRAIL BECAUSE 
THEY STATE I DIDN'T DO IT! MY PUBLIC DEFENDER DIDN'T 
DO HIS JOB I DON'T BELIEVE HE EVER DOES. FRANKLY HE 
KNEW IF I WAS FOUND NOT GUILTY I WOULD HAVE GROUNDS TO 
SUE THE STATE AND HE DID HALF OF THE COUNTYS' WORK FOR 
THEM! NOW I WANT OUT! THIS IS IMMORAL, UNETHICAL, AND 
I BELIEVE ILLEGAL! I HAVE GIVEN EVERYONE INVOLVED, 
INCLUDING YOU, THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT IN BELIEVING 
YOU WOULDN'T ALLOW PROBABLY THE MOST CRUEL THING THAT 
CAN BE DONE TO MAN OR BEAST TO HAPPEN. I WANT 
RETRIBUTION, RESTITUTION, AND RESTORATION IMMEDIATELY. 
I BELIEVE THAT THE SOONER YOU SEE YOUR WAY CLEAR 
TO MAKING THE SITUATION RIGHT WHENEVER YOU CAN THE 
BETTER YOUR WORLD WILL BE. I AM NOT A CRIMINAL. I AM 
NOT A VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL AND I DID NOT COMMIT A CRIME. 
I WAS A VICTIM AND I WAS TAKEN FOR A RIDE AND YOU HAVE 
ONLY TAKEN ME FOR ANOTHER. 
I AM A VERY GOOD INDIVIDUAL AND SOMEONE WILL 
EVENTUALLY NOTICE I HAVE BEEN WRONGED. 
PLEASE FOR EVERYONE'S SAKE MAKE THE SYSTEM OF 
CHECKS AND BALANCES WORK. IT'S TIME TO BE FAIR. 
I DO BELIEVE YOU KNOW I DID NOT COMMIT A CRIME. I 
DON'T PARTICULARLY CARE WHAT REASONS OR RATIONAL WAS 
AND WERE USED TO COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT WOULD BE 
EXCEPTABLE TO LOCK UP A GOOD, FREE, INDIVIDUAL, 
MYSELF!, BUT THEY MUST HAVE COME FROM THE COMPLETELY 
NEGATIVE SIDE OF REALITY. 
I WANT WHAT'S HAPPENED TO ME "REPAIRED" AND I WANT 
IT DONE IMMEDIATELY. I GUARENTE YOU ARE TAMPERING WITH 
THE WRONG SIDE OF POWER AND RELIGION. YOU ARE 
UNLICENSED BY ME AND TO DO THIS TO ME OR ANYTHING LIKE 
ME IS "NATURALY ILLEGAL." 
YOU BETTER HUMBLE YOURSELF AND FIND OUT HOW FAR 
GONE YOU REALLY ARE. I AM A GOOD PERSON AND THE 
MAJORITY OF PEOPLE EFFECTED BY ME GET BETTER. I AM NOT 
A PROBLEM. THIS ENTIRE SITUATION HAS GONE WAY, WAY, 
TOO FAR. YOU WILL BE MAKING ONE OF THE BIGEST MISTAKES 
OF YOUR LIFE TO LET IT CONTINUE. 
REMEDY THE SITUATION OR BE SICK WITH IT FOREVER! 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR RECONSIDERATION 
SINCERELY, 
BRET CRIDDLE 
Mr. Criddle prepared two highly detailed and rambling 
nineteen page responses to the presentence report - one in 
handwriting and one typed. The responses contain numerous highly 
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inappropriate comments and do not lend themselves to summary, but 
should be read by the Court. 
Anyone who was familiar with Mr. Criddle's correspondence 
with the court, particularly officers of the court, should have 
investigated Mr. Criddle's competency prior to trial and prior to 
sentencing. 
3. The 90 Day Diagnostic Report Demonstrates Mr. Criddle's 
Incompetency. 
The diagnostic report submitted for Mr. Criddle's sentencing 
diagnoses Mr. Criddle with "alcohol abuse, adult antisocial 
behavior, and schizotypal personality disorder with paranoid 
features." Diagnostic report at 2. In discussing Mr. Criddle's 
behavioral characteristics, the report states, 
He is impulsive, self-indulgent, egocentric, immature 
and irritable. He is often tense and overreacts to 
even minor sources of stress. Mr. Criddle tends to be 
suspicious, obsessional, moody, and exhibits a sense of 
grandiosity. His judgment is poor and he has 
difficulty expressing emotions without overreacting or 
over controlling. Mr. Criddle has the potential to act 
out his conflicts in a physical aggressive manner. He 
is uninhibited in risk taking, has a high energy level, 
and a strong need for stimulation and excitement. 
Furthermore, he engages in rationalization and blames 
others for his difficulties. 
Diagnostic report at 3. 
These diagnoses dovetail with Mr. Criddle's behavior in 
court and correspondence and demonstrate that Mr. Criddle was 
suffering from a "mental disorder" resulting in "his inability to 
have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings 
against him" and "his inability to ... participate in the 
proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational 
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understanding." Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2. 
C. This Court Should Order A New Trial. 
As previously noted, due process requires trial courts to 
initiate competency proceedings whenever evidence of a 
defendant's incompetency to proceed arises. E.g. State v. Young, 
supra. 
As discussed above, the record in this case is replete with 
evidence of Mr. Criddle's incompetency. Mr. Criddle's behavior 
in court and in writing constitutes evidence of his incompetence, 
which triggered the trial court's duty to initiate full 
competency proceedings under Utah and federal law. Young, supra. 
Even if evidence of Mr. Criddle's incompetency did not arise 
until after the trial, the trial court should have instigated 
competency proceedings under Young, and trial counsel should have 
moved to arrest judgment under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
23, which provides, 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, 
the court upon its own initiative may, or upon motion 
of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts 
proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, 
or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is other 
good cause for the arrest of judgment. 
Upon arresting judgment the court may, unless a 
judgment of acquittal of the offense charged is entered 
or jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until the 
defendant is charged anew or retried, or may enter any 
other order as may be just and proper under the 
circumstances. 
Under this rule, arrest of judgment is the appropriate step to 
take when the court or parties realize after judgment but prior 
to sentence that the defendant was incompetent. See State v. 
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Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 594-95 (Utah 1988). 
It appears that Mr. Criddle's conviction must be reversed 
under Young, despite the fact that neither trial counsel raised 
the issue of Mr. Griddle's incompetency because the law placed 
the duty squarely on the shoulders of the trial court to 
institute competency proceedings when evidence of competency 
arises. Id. 
In the event that this Court must, the Court may resort 
again to the doctrines of plain error and ineffective assistance 
of counsel in correcting the due process violation stemming from 
the trial of Mr. Criddle while he was incompetent. See State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989)(discussing plain error and 
ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines). 
The need to address Mr. Criddle's incompetency should have 
been plain to both the trial court and trial counsel. Both the 
trial court and trial counsel performed in an objectively 
deficient manner in failing to address the competency issue. 
There is a reasonable probability of a different result in the 
absence of the error, for Mr. Criddle may not have been tried and 
convicted at all, had the proper competency proceedings been 
followed. See Verde, supra. 
III. THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO RECUSE HERSELF 
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 governs recusal of 
judges, and provides, 
(a) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other 
disability, the judge before whom a trial has begun is 
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unable to continue with the trial, any other judge of 
that court or any judge assigned by the presiding 
officer of the Judicial Council, upon certifying that 
he has familiarized himself with the record of the 
trial, may, unless otherwise disqualified, proceed with 
and finish the trial, but if the assigned judge is 
satisfied that neither he nor another substitute judge 
can proceed with the trial, he may, in his discretion, 
grant a new trial. 
(b) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other 
disability, the judge before whom a defendant has been 
tried is unable to perform the duties required of the 
court after a verdict of guilty, any other judge of 
that court or any judge assigned by the presiding 
officer of the Judicial Council may perform those 
duties. 
(c) If the prosecution or a defendant in any 
criminal action or proceeding files an affidavit that 
the judge before whom the action or proceeding is to be 
tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, either against 
the party or his attorney or in favor of any opposing 
party to the suit, the judge shall proceed no further 
until the challenge is disposed of. Every affidavit 
shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief 
that the bias or prejudice exists and shall be filed as 
soon as practicable after the case has been assigned or 
the bias or prejudice is known. No affidavit may be 
filed unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel of 
record that the affidavit and application are made in 
good faith. 
(d) If the challenged judge questions the 
sufficiency of the allegation of disqualification, he 
shall enter an order directing that a copy be forthwith 
certified to another named judge of the same court or 
of a court of like jurisdiction, which judge shall then 
pass upon the legal sufficiency of the allegations. If 
the challenged judge does not question the legal 
sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom 
the affidavit is certified finds that it is legally 
sufficient, another judge shall be called to try the 
case or to conduct the proceeding. If the judge to whom 
the affidavit is certified does not find the affidavit 
to be legally sufficient, he shall enter a finding to 
that effect and the challenged judge shall proceed with 
the case or proceeding. 
(e) (I) If the prosecution or a defendant in a 
criminal action believes that a fair and impartial 
trial cannot be had in the jurisdiction where the 
action is pending, either may, by motion, supported by 
an affidavit setting forth facts, ask to have the trial 
of the case transferred to another jurisdiction. 
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(ii) If the court is satisfied that the 
representations made in the affidavit are true and 
justify transfer of the case, the court shall enter an 
order for the removal of the case to the court of 
another jurisdiction free from the objection and all 
records pertaining to the case shall be transferred 
forthwith to the court in the other county. If the 
court is not satisfied that the representations so made 
justify transfer of the case, the court shall either 
enter an order denying the transfer or order a formal 
hearing in court to resolve the matter and receive 
further evidence with respect to the alleged prejudice. 
(f) When a change of judge or place of trial is 
ordered all documents of record concerning the case 
shall be transferred without delay to the judge who 
shall hear the case. 
Under well established Utah law, a trial judge has a duty to 
recuse herself if her impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned, even in cases where no actual bias is shown. State 
v. Neelev, 748 P.2d 1091, 1093-95 (Utah 1988), cert, denied, 487 
U.S. 1220 (1988); State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 911 (Utah App. 
1990), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990); State v. 
Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 925-26 (Utah App. 1990). Under this law, 
reversal is required if Rule 29 is not complied with, if there is 
a showing of an abuse of discretion, or a showing of actual bias. 
Id. 
A judge is biased if he has ua hostile feeling or spirit of 
ill will toward one of the litigants, or undue friendship or 
favoritism toward one," or has "some active personal hostility 
toward the defendant." Haslam v. Morrison, 190 P.2d 520, 523 
(Utah 1948)(citations omitted). See also Black7s Law 
Dictionary,{"Actual bias consists in the existence of a state of 
mind on the part of the juror which satisfies the court, in the 
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exercise of a sound discretion, that the juror cannot try the 
issues impartially and without prejudice to the substantial 
rights of the party challenging."). 
In the instant case, Judge Stirba was actually biased 
against Mr. Criddle. Her letters to the board of pardons, in the 
addendum, demonstrate that Judge Stirba felt personally 
threatened by Mr. Criddle. Regardless of whether Mr. Criddle's 
actions, statements and letters were properly interpreted as 
threats, the fact that Judge Stirba felt personally threatened by 
Mr. Criddle demonstrates actual bias. E.g. Haslam, supra. 
Under rule 29 and Utah case law, Judge Stirba should have 
recused himself because she was actually biased, and her failure 
to do so constitutes an abuse of discretion and reversible error. 
See e.g. Neeley; Haslam, supra. Compare Kleinert v. Kimball 
Elevator Co., 905 P.2d 297 (Utah App. 1993)(declining to address 
recusal issue raised for first time on appeal), cert. denied, 913 
P.2d 749 (Utah 1996), with Regional Sales Agency v. Reichert, 830 
P.2d 252 (Utah 1992)(majority indicates that recusal is trial 
court's responsibility, not counsel's). 
It appears that Judge Stirba's fear of Mr. Criddle was not 
voiced until after sentencing, when she wrote twice to the board 
of pardons. Thus, trial counsel had no opportunity to raise the 
issue concerning her disqualification to act on the case. While 
trial counsel did not raise the judge's partiality, the plain 
error doctrine provides a means of addressing the error on 
appeal. See e.g. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 
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1989)(discussing showings which must be made under plain error 
doctrine). Given Judge Stirba's personal fear of Mr. Criddle, 
the need for Judge Stirba's recusal should have been obvious to 
her. 
Given the relative weakness of the State's case against Mr. 
Criddle, the relatively non-serious nature of the facts proved 
against Mr. Criddle, and the fact that the sentencing matrix in 
Mr. Criddle's case recommended probation (presentence report, 
form 3), there is a reasonable probability that the results in 
this case, both the verdict and ultimate sentence, would have 
been different had Judge Stirba recused herself. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT MUST HOLD A RESTITUTION HEARING. 
A. FACTS 
Judge Stirba ordered Mr. Criddle to pay restitution in the 
amount of $4,745, jointly and severally with Mr. Criddlefs co-
defendant (R. 197). 
Prior to trial, Mr. Steele had argued that no restitution 
should be imposed because the restitution all flowed from the 
criminal mischief count, which was dismissed prior to trial on 
the State's motion (R. 312).10 Judge Stirba had indicated that 
10
 See State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah App. 
1993)("Restitution should be ordered only in cases where 
liability is clear as a matter of law and where commission of the 
crime clearly establishes causality of the injury or damages."), 
cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201 (authorizing damages for special damages recoverable in a 
civil action based on the crime of conviction or other activities 
for which the defendant accepts responsibility); Utah Code Ann. § 
77-18-1 (same). 
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she would address the matter later, but never did (R. 313). 
Mr. Fratto argued at the sentencing hearing that there were 
questions as to the proper amount of restitution to be awarded 
(R. 325-327). 
Judge Stirba ordered Mr. Criddle to pay $4,74 5.00. The 
total amount recommended in the presentence report was $4,652.87 
(presentence report at 15), but the figures in the presentence 
report which supposedly itemize the restitution order total up to 
$3,930.87 (presentence report at 5). The trailer owner, Lester 
Gayheart, testified that the maximum damage done was $3,000 (R. 
326). The presentence report listed figures from Steven Howe, 
the victim in Judge Brian's case (Presentence Report at 5). 
Judge Stirba indicated that Mr. Criddle could have a 
restitution hearing before the Board of Pardons if there was a 
conflict about what he owed (R. 228). 
B. LAW 
The primary error of the trial court was her refusal to 
afford Mr. Criddle a full hearing on the restitution issues, and 
her assumption that the matter could be relegated to the Board of 
Pardons. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 expressly requires trial 
courts to hold full restitution hearings at the time of 
sentencing if restitution is in dispute. It states in subsection 
(4) (e) , 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, 
amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court 
shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a 
full hearing on the issue. 
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This Court has recognized that by virtue of section 76-3-
201, criminal defendants are entitled to full restitution 
hearings, wherein they may present witnesses, and cross-examine 
witnesses for the State, upon request. State v. Starnes, 841 
P.2d 712, 715 (Utah App. 1992). 
Inasmuch as the presentence report in Judge Stirba's case 
plainly and erroneously included the restitution information 
pertinent to Judge Brian's case and victim, Steven Howe 
(presentence report at 5), Judge Stirba had no basis in the 
report for her restitution order. Particularly where the total 
of the itemized list in the presentence report ($3,930.87 
(presentence report at 5)) was different from the total amount of 
restitution requested in the presentence report ($4,652.87 
(presentence report at 15)), and where both of those figures were 
different from the figure describing the maximum damage at trial 
($3,000 (R. 326)), the judge should have recognized the need for 
a hearing, rather than ordering Mr. Criddle to pay an amount 
different from all of the foregoing figures ($4,745.00, R. 327). 
Particularly given the issues raised by Mr. Steele 
concerning whether any restitution can be ordered in light of the 
State's dismissal of the criminal mischief charge, which Judge 
Stirba agreed to address (R. 312, 313), and given Mr. Fratto's 
again raising unspecified concerns about the accuracy of the 
restitution recommended in the presentence report (R. 325-327), 
Judge Stirba should have held a hearing. Starnes. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Mr. Griddle's conviction and order 
the case dismissed. In the alternative, the Court should order a 
new trial and a restitution hearing before a new judge, to 
proceed only after Mr. Criddle's competency is evaluated and 
established. 
Dated this G? day of September, 1996 
Patrick L. Anderson 
Attorney for Mr. Criddle 
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